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The Catholic Moral Tradition 
on Providing Food and Fluids 
Sister Elizabeth McMillan, R.S.M., Ph.D. 
Sisler Eli::ahelh is a sen ior associGle in Corporale and Social E1hics H'ith 
Ihe Ca{/1Olic Heallh Association o/ Ihe Uniled SIGles. 
Catholic documents. and specifically the Vatican Declaralion on 
EUlhanasia of 1980. frame the discussion on care of the terminally ill with 
the fundamental assertion that life is a gift which we hold in trust. not a 
possess ion over which we have absolute dominion.! It is our moral 
responsibi lity to nourish. prese rve and protect li fe , while acknowledging 
our human limitations-ultimately the limitation of death it self. The 
Catholic position on the use of life-sustaining trea tment in the care of the 
terminally ill derives from these basic convict ions about life and death. 
To recognize that life is a gift and death an unavoidable end to human 
life as we experience it da y by da y is not yet to tell the whole story. 
Catho lics believe that. despite the universal human experience of death as 
a mysterious and fearsome rupture , it is also the on ly 'Passage to the 
fullness of life. As believers , Catholics try to comfort each other and 
encourage one another to welcome that fuller life in Christ even in the 
throes of fear and pain. In these moments people become aware of their 
vulnerab ilit y as human beings. They learn that to be human- especially in 
a health care setting where there is so much sickness and death - is to live 
as gracefully as possible the tensio n between trying to eliminate threats to 
life and health and accepting the fact that some life threats cannot be 
eliminated 2 
Broadly speaking, any intervention which will eliminate a threat to life 
or health , e.g. , antibiotics, can be said to be life-sustaining, as can any 
treatment which supplements a phys iological function , e.g ., insulin or 
blood products. However, the treatment decisions which have ca used the 
most consternation are those that artificially supplant vital functions , such 
as kidney dialysis machines and especially respirators. 
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Amo ng the questions about whether to provide ce rtain life-saving 
trea tmen ts to patient s. the mos t difficult. perhaps. are th ose tha t ask about 
the withholding and withdrawing o f nutriti o n a nd hyd rati on provided 
thro ugh IVs or feeding tubes. These questions will be ad dressed here 
within the context of traditional Catholic tea ching on the te rminall y ill. 
That is. we will no t treat these ques tions as if they required their ow n kind 
o f justifica t ion. but as ques ti o ns alrea d y covered by the principles which 
goye rn the use of ordinary and ext raordinary mea ns. Cath o lic mo ral 
discourse on these ques tions reflects a strong emphasis on the mo rall y 
dec isi\T impo rtance of th e patient's well-being in all deci s io ns about 
continuing or withdrawing lifc support treatments. Beca use there are a 
number of important ways in which the situati o n of a severely disabled 
newborn infant differs from adults who are nea r dea th. I will not attempt 
to address here the spec ial case o f the seriously ill newborn . 
Catholic Teaching on Ordinary and Extraordinary Means 
Since the moral thcologian . Banel. introduced the terms "ordinary" and 
"cx tra o rdinary" mcans into thc discussion of our duti es regarding the 
prese ryation o flifcat thec nd ofthc 16th ccnt ury. we ha\T learned that we 
are obligated to take "ordinary means" to sustain our life and heal th. but 
we are not o bligated to takc "extraordinary mea ns" . The theo logical 
commentary which followed Banez attempt ed to clarify what these terms 
mea nt in practice by identifying what should count as ex traordinary (e .g .. 
surge ry before anti se ptics and anes thetics). Some treatments were 
declared extraordinary becausc too painful. repulsive to the patient or 
ex pens i ve. Ea 1'1 y d efi n it ions of 0 I'd i na ry mea ns as "wha t na t ure intends" or 
"w ha t is generally a vailable to a ll". turned out to be lcss helpful in the 
co ntex t of clinical medicine. In the 1940s and ear ly ·SOs. Ge rald Kell y 
rev iewed the hist o ry of these basic moral te rms and formulat ed working 
definitions more apt for eva luating the practice of mod ern clinical 
med ici ne.' 
His updated definitions mad e a distinction betwee n ord fnary means and 
ex traordinary mea ns which labeled "ex traordinary" those which "cannot 
be o btained o r used with o ut excessive ex pense. pain. or other 
inco nve nience. o r which. if used . would not o lTer a rea so nable hope of 
benefi t" . and o rdill IIr.\'. those which "0 ITer a reaso nable hope of bend it and 
which ca n be o btained and used without excessive ex pense. pain o r o ther 
inconve nience".~ 
Cronin Reworked Definitions 
Daniel Cro nin rewo rk ed Kell y's definitions in a way which gave slight ly 
more emphas is to spec ific ci rcu mstances and the uniqueness of the 
individual patient : 
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O rd i n<.l ry me~IIlS or l'onsen'i ng lift.:' Illc.t Y he d efi neo as {h llS(' Ill e a IlS CO llllllon I~ · lI:-.cd 
in gi\'cll circums tan ces . \\"hich this indi\"jdllal in his prese nt physical. 
psychological a Ild eco nomi c cond it io n ea 11 rC<lsonahly employ wit h dcfi nile hope 
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of proportionatc hcndit. 
Extraordinary means o f clll1scn"ing life m~ly he defined as those means not 
common ly ll sed in g i\'cil circumstances. o r tho st.:' mea ns which this iIH.li\"i<.lua\ in 
his present physical. psychological and eco no mic condition cann ot n:asonahly 
cmp l",·. or. if hc can. lIill not giw him ddinitc hopc of proportionatc hcncfit. ' 
Both of th ese sets of definitions refl ec t clea rl y th e importance of the 
patient's assessment of what is ext ra ord inary - too much to bear when 
compared with the therapeutic outcomes which can be realistically hoped 
for . This clear e mphasis is, in fact. charac teristic of Cat hol ic moral 
teac hing on the care of the grave ly ill. 
Contemporaneous with Ke ll y's and Cronin's work, Pope Pius X II 
identified ordinary means with means which do not in vo lve any "grave 
burden for onese lf or another" . "A more strict obligation would be too 
burdensome for most men and wo uld render the a tt ainme nt of the high e r, 
more important good too difficult," he discerned.(' 
While th e patient's dUly in light of these principles was often difficu lt to 
d iscern in practice, th e doctor's was even more comp li cated. He had a 
spec ia l dut y to the profession of medicine and the larger fam il y of 
hu mank ind to stave offall temptations to "defeatism" under the threat of 
pathology, and thus to take aggressive s teps to preserve life. 
Kelly observed that some doctors adopted what he ca lled a "moderate" 
moral posture regarding their responsibility to th e terminally ill patient: 
others, an "extreme" posture. He cites a doctor who, in his view, 
character izes the moderate post ure: 
Mv d ut y, as I see it. is to preservc lifc, to fight for a paticnt's lifc with evcry 
resou rccatmycommand. rcmcmhcr ingalwa ys that'a man's ncvc rli ckcd till hc's 
lickcd.' Buttherc comes a time whc n he is li cked. If a doctor has trainedi ud g mcnt 
and experience a nd that desperate dislike of dcfeat which is instilled into eac h of 
us, he knows so metimes, becausc he knows hi s pathology, that every human thing 
ha s bee n done: that he cannot preserve life t hat the dec ision has bcen take n 
from hil11. 
, 
And the n hi s duty, Ithink, isjust as clear - t o make th a t patient comfo rt able by 
scdati ves if he can, regardless of anything e lse a nd how much it tak es to do so.' 
Those with what Kelly ca lled the "extreme" attitude would see their duty 
in simpler, more categorical terms: to prese rve life as long as possible by 
any means at their disposal. When attending to a d ying patient or 
permanently comatose patient , the moral task of the "extremists" was 
simple; they had one ru le to follow. The "moderates" by contrast, had the 
task of assess ing whether a particular treatment was likely to be of any 
benefit to this patient , and thus , whether it was worth the pain, effo rt and 
expense, The problem with relying on a sing le moral principle that requires 
us to preserve life with all the means available in a period of advanced 
biotechnology is that after a whi le a ll means become ordinarr in practice. 
Situations of Life-Sustaining Treatments 
When technologically comp lex life-sustaining treatments became 
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increasingly easy to provid e clinically and financially. we e nd ed up 
sanctifying with the moral principle. "Do everything". what in man y cases 
we were d o ing for an esse ntially nonmora l (if not, in some circumstances . 
immoral) reason: ease and convenience of administration. We felt we 
should "do eve rything" . but we got to th e point where we were no longe r 
asking th e moral reason why. So now we ha ve to ask . is it because it is easy 
for us. or beca use it is the right thing to do for the patient') Over time . the 
moral concerns found in papa l statements and theological commentary 
about th e "grave burden" imposed on th e dying patient by certain 
treatments were stifled by the " technological imperative" posing as a moral 
imperative . Now we have to look more closely at the mora l imperative: 
what are we. ind eed. obligated to do for the patient') 
The Vatican f)ec/aration on 1:'lIfhanasia which came out in 1980. 
recogniled the shift in the meanings of ordinan' and e.\'traordinarr and th e 
resulting co nfusion. They drew from the ongoing th eo logical in4uiry into 
these issues the concepts proportionate and di.lpro/}()rtionate in order to 
clarify the moral meaning 0.1' ordinary and ex traordinary. In the words of 
the f)ec/aration. a judgment can be made as to whether a particular 
med ical intervention is a proportionate or disproportionate means of 
sustaining life by 
st ud yi ng lhe type of t rL'al lll L' nt to hc lIscd. its dc.:grcL' or complexity or risk. its cos t 
and till' r oss ihiliti cs of lI s ing. it. and comp;:lring these clemc nts \\"ith the result that 
ca n he e.\rec ted. l<Iking int o accollnt th e state or thc sick rcrson and his or he r 
physical and moral resources. 
It is important to interpret th e Dhi('a/ and Re/igious DireClil'es in light 
of this refinement of terms in Catholic m ora l tradition as it ha s developed 
in res p onse to medical science.x Directive 28. for example reads. "The 
failure to supply the ordinary means o f preserv ing life is e4uivalent to 
euthanasia . Howe ve r neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to the 
use of ex traordinary means ." In the li g ht of th e Dec/aration, this directive 
IT4uires that life-sustaining measures which are not dll'{Jro/wrtionatelr 
burd e nsom e (ethica/lrextraordinary) be provid ed forthe patient, butdoes 
Illit re4u ire the prov ision of those which are burdensome or without 
realistic hope of benefit. Moreover. Directive 33 explicitly rules out 
treatments which are disproporti o nat e. th a t is. unjustifiable in terms of 
pred ictable benefit to the patient when all of the factors affecting the 
pati e nt's co ndition are taken into account. "Unnecessary procedures. 
whether diagnostic or therapeutic . are morally objectionable. A procedure 
is unnecessa ry when no proportionat e reason justifies it. A furtiuri, any 
proced ure that is contra-indicated by so und medical standard s is 
unnecessa ry." Even if a physician should judge it advisable to continue a 
particular life-s ustaining treatment, the pa tient (or family membe r on 
be ha If of ani ncom peten t pa tien!) ca n refuse trea tment which is excessively 
burde nsome . 
Those who raise ethical 4ues t ions in regard to withholding or 
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withdrawing life support in this era of modern medicine are usuall y asking 
what we ought to dolor a patient , or what we arejustified in no/ doing/c)r a 
patient. The questions are about treatment, medical interve ntions by the 
practitione rs of medical science to remove or mitigate threat s to th e 
patient's life and health. There is often th e unspoken assumption that when 
"nothing more can be done ," ph ys icians have no furth e r obligation to the 
pati ent. But a moral tradition that gives decisive weight to how a particula r 
treatment affects a patient's comfort and moral support also carries 
implied obligations to provide for those needs as long as the terminally ill 
patient continues to live. 
Withholding Intravenous and Tube Feeding 
The most pressing of ~he new questions about the artificial supplanting 
of vital functions is that of replacing naural eating and drinking with 
artificial nutrition and hydration systems. 9 It is pressing because the 
procedures ha ve been perfected to the point where it is not difficult to keep 
numbers of people on feeding systems for long periods oftime. 1o It is also 
press ing because the moral line between medical inte rvention for 
therapeutic ends and ordinary hygienic ca re, in the case of nutrition and 
fluid s, cannot easily be drawn. At times it looks like ordinary care; at other 
moments , in other cases, it looks more like treatment which is futile and 
possibly burdensome as well. In still other cases it looks like both at once: 
perhaps a gesture of ordinary care, and if so, required ; but perhaps futile. 
and if so, unjustified. Some of us are tempted to seek refuge from this 
ambiguity in a moral posture which requires us always to feed. 
Commenting on a study of phys ician attitudes on withdrawal of 
nutrition and fluids from terminally ill and comatose patients, Bayer noted 
that almost all of the doctors surveyed said that they would start IV feeding 
for a dying or comatose person. Noting further that 27% of these doctors 
would order an amount of fluids which would be insufficient to sustain the 
person's life , Bayer suggests that their purpose in orderi 9g the feeding 
regimes may not have been "medical, but symbolic and psychological: to 
satisfy the physician's sense of duty, and to prepare the patient's family for 
the worst."ll He questions the moral validity of this kind of instinctive 
"sense of duty" on the part of the physician. It is precisely this which at 
times appears to be , in fact , a place of retreat from moral discernment at 
the expense of the patient. 
Others also have spoken of what has come to be called the "symbolic" 
meaning of feeding. ' 2 Eating, drinking and feeding are among the most 
basic , even sacred, human activities, it is said. The issue of whether to feed 
or not to feed is such an emotional one for us, not only because it is about 
survival at its most primitive level , but also because the gesture of feeding 
another, especially infants and the disabled who are not able to feed 
themselves , is one of the most basic human ways to express caring and 
friendship. On the other hand , "artificial feeding reduces food intake to its 
barest essential- nourishment of the patient. It is introduced as a medical 
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treatment and excludes the sensory, social and cultural pleasures and 
traditions associated with eating."1 3 
Worries About Optional Feeding 
Some are worried that if we admit that feeding is optional for some very 
ill people, we are implicitly admitting that some kind s of life are not worth 
sustaining. To declare feeding optional is to start down the slippery slope. 
For them, continuance of this fragile life, no matter how burdensome, is in 
itself a human good. To withhold or withdraw artificial feeding from a 
debilitated patient betrays our lack of regard for his or her life ; it is to 
reduce him or her to a burden. Those who assume this moral posture are 
particularly resistant to making feeding , even artificial feeding with its 
attendant risks , optional , because in their view it is contradictory to 
obligate ourselves to care for another while denying him or her food , the 
most basic human need. For them , the provision of nourishment is such an 
elemental human response to one in need that refusing to provide it 
threatens the humanity of both the needy person and the one who refuses 
to respond to that need. 
And even for those of us who see mostly technical processes more or less 
anonymously at work, there is a vestige of the traditional "natural" 
meaning present in those gestures . Those who are involved in managing 
the feeding systems know, after all , that they are providing sustenance for 
another human being. And they know that if they don't provide it , that 
human being will die . The situation is different from the one in which the 
patient whose respirator is removedjust mal' begin to breathe on her own. 
And so we hesitate. 
But can we honestly say that artificial feeding procedures a/wa\'s 
represent the most compassionate and respectful response to a patient? If 
we insist that we must a/ways feed a patient , no matter what his condition 
or his desires, are we really acting in a way which is consistent with the 
Catholic tradition? Or is it not often the case, rather, that those who order 
and administer feeding regimes are doing so becau te they dare not 
discontinue them, and even that they dare not ask themselves whether 
these procedures are not from the patient's point of view, futile or 
excessively burdensome? 
Enteral and parenteral nutrition systems which supplant the natural 
feeding activities rob the latter of virtually all of their human meaning. '4 
The mechanisms themselves and many of the technical gestures employed 
to carry out the nutrition and hydration of the patient who is permanently 
comatose or very nearly dead , mask almost entirely a meaning we have 
learned to associate with the terms, "eating", "drinking", and even 
"feeding". 
Consequently, there is a growing consensus among Catholic thinkers 
and others as well that there is no moral justification on the basis of the 
vestigial images of natural feeding barely present in nutrition / hydration 
systems, for invoking a moral principle which prohibits us categorically 
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from withdrawing an art ificial feeding system. 15 Even though for us it is 
technically and psychologically convenient, "natural", to continue feeding, 
for this patient's good it may be time to withdraw. Mechanical , 
impersona l, invasive and risky feeding programs are experienced by some 
patients and their families as inhumane rather than as caring gestures. In 
some situat ions, for some patients, what is promoted by medical or 
nursing staff as the symbol of human compassion is totally emptied of its 
meaning. Some patients experience it as force feed ing, a treatment they'd 
rather be spared. Situations where restraints or sedation or both are 
required in order to feed an incompetent elderly patient dramatically 
portray the difficulty of determining the moral limits of what we call care. 
A lthough the line between a medical intervention with curative intent 
and comfort care cannot be cleanly drawn in abstraction from the 
decisions which have to be made about people's lives, guidelines can be 
formulated for morally responsible decision-making which are well 
founded in the Catholic tradition regarding the care of the terminally ill. A 
fundamental principle , to which we have already referred, is that a 
competent adult may refuse any treatment , including feeding, which he 
finds to be excessively burdensome or futile. A physician who judges that 
the patient's decision to refuse treatment violates his sense of what is right, 
can withdraw from the case. When the adult patient is not competent , the 
first order of business is to establish as accurately as possible the patient's 
wishes from advance directives (e.g ., "living wills , " Christian Affirmation 
of Life") relatives and close friends. Then a determination about what to 
do must be made in light of the patient's present circumstances: how sick 
he is, how near death , how much pain he is in, is he "ready" to die, is his 
conscious life at such a low ebb that he has slipped into a "persistent 
vegetative state"? 
Additional Guidelines Suggested 
Such questions suggest further guidelines implied by the Catholic 
emphasis on the value of the individual patient's life and specified by the 
individual patient's condition and degree of awareness . One kind of 
patient , of course, who falls outside of the morally problematic, is the one 
who has been confirmed as dead , i.e. , whose spontaneous respiratory and 
cardiac functions have irreversibly ceased or whose total brain, including 
the brain stem, has irreversibly ceased to function. 
Those who have been declared irreversibly comatose or in a "persistent 
vegetative state" (PYS), but not dead , represent one kind of patient about 
whom we do have to deliberate. Such patients have elicited serious moral 
and legal discussion , particularly since many of them survive for months or 
even years if they are fed . It is because we can , with technological assists , 
put them in a situation of long hopeless survival, that we have to ask the 
two fundamental questions which mark off the area of extraordinary or 
disproportionate means as articulated withing the Catholic moral 
community . First , we have to ask if, by sustaining the patient 
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technologically. we are not impos ing upon him a kind of surviva l which is 
hurd enso me to him. to his famil y and to a ll those who bear the cost of such 
a d ec ision. If. lik e th e judge who ruled in the case of Paul Broph y. we are 
re luctant to re mo ve a feeding tube from a ma n who will neve r reco ve r 
co nsciousness because to do so would re4uire us t o mak e ajudgment a bout 
the 4uality of his life . we still ha ve to weigh the second 4uestion.' 6 We still 
ha ye to a sk. e\e n if he is not in pain . whether it is not futile to feed him 
i nsofa r as he has no ho pe of e me rgi ng fro m his vegeta t ive s ta te . To a ns wer 
that it is not futile hecause it keeps him ali ve. of course. begs th e 4ues tion as 
to whether we o llght to kee p him aliYe. To refrain from se riou sly 
e nt e rtaining this 4uestion is to neglect to consider the indiv idual human 
heing . Paul Brophy. ade4uate ly. And to neg lect to consider him in all of his 
concrete circumstances is to misunde rs tand the traditional Catholic 
c mpha s is on th e patient as the meas ure of what sh o uld be taken as 
ext raordinary or di sproportionate . 
In th e Barhe r case. th e court he ld that th e 4ues tion of withdrawal of 
feeding sh o uld he assessed ,. in tcrms of the proportionate he nefit to the 
patient: 
F\"l'n if ,I proposed course of trl'atml'llt might he e.\tl' mely pa infu l o r int ru si\"e, it 
would still hl' propo n ion<ltt.:: treatmellt if the prognosis \\",IS fo r co mrktl' cur t.:: or 
sig nifi can t impr{H'cme nt in th e pat ie nt 's con dit io n. On th e ot her hand. a 
treatlllellt cOll rse \\ 'hich is only min imally painful o r illtrusi\ 'l' may IHlll l't hek ss he 
eOllsi(iL'red d isproportio nat e to till' potential hellefit s i f th e prognos is is \ irtllally 
hopekss 1'0 1' any sign ifica nt illlrrO\el1le llt in co nditiol1. l " 
This particular passage from the ruling reflects faithfull y the way in w hi ch 
proportionat e and di s propo rtionat e mean s of sustaining life are usuall y 
und e rstood by Catholic moralists. 
A numbe r of Catholic authors find justification in th e removal of life 
support. including feeding systems. in th e appropriate suhordination of 
th e e nd s of human life to its ultimate e nd. which transce nds the tcmporal. 
For them to continue to feed a patie nt in a persiste nt vege tati ve state is to 
assign absolute va lu e to a certain very limited form of lill and in so doing. 
t o diminish the ultimate ly more va luable spirituallifc of a pe rson ." 
Another grou p o f patients we need to consider carefully are those in th e 
la st stages of te rminal illness . After clearly stat ing that we can nc ithe r 
di rectl y take the life of a not her nor a sk a not her to assist in o u r suicidc. the 
Dl!c/aratio/l O il Elitha/lasia also says that the patient (or. in thc case of 
incompete nce. others on his or her be half) can "judge that the tec hni4ues 
applied impose on the patient strain or suffe ring o ut o f proportion to th e 
be nefit s which he o r she ma y gain from s uch tec hni4ues ." A nd again . 
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\Vhe ll illc\'itank death is imminent in spi te of the Illl'a il S used. it is permitted ill 
co nscit.:: l1 cc to take the d ccis io ll to refuse forms or treatment that \Hllil d only 
st.::curc a precario us and hurucilsollle prolongation of Iifl- . so lo ng as til l' Ilorma l 
care due to the sick person in similar cases is no t intcrruptcd. 
The re continues to be much discussion over an acce ptable definition of 
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"imminent." To say that a person's death is imminent should probably 
mean that he or she ha s less than a year to live . Some would want to 
de-limit the time frame more narrowl y. In anycase. a decision to withhold 
nourishment from a terminall y ill person should not come before he is 
"ready to die." This moment is. of course. discerned on ly with d ifficu lt y 
and by weighing together all of the factors in the patient's condition and 
subjective attitude. 
Some patients are in so much pain that they cannot bear th e prospect of 
lingering for a long time. There are times when those who are competent 
can legitimately refuse to be sustained by artificial feeding systems. Those 
who make decisions on behalf of incompetent patients have the difficult 
task of trying to discern whether they are in pain and their degree of 
tolerance. For these patients. too. pain can constitute a burden which 
wou ld morally justify the request to withdraw feeding in th e la st stages of 
their illness. 
One of the most difficult groups of people about whom to make 
nutritional support decisions IS the elderly who are seve rel y debilitated by 
age and sickness. but not on the brink of death. Like Claire Conroy. most 
of them have no one fatal disease . nor have they slipped into a persistent 
vegetative state. I'! But they are sick enough that they could die at any time 
and often they are chronica ll y confused. severely or "pleasantly" senile. 
Not on ly do they have physiological disabilities which severe ly limit their 
capacity to swallow. digest and absorb food . but they have lost their 
interest in eating. Some actively resist attempts to feed them orally and 
with art ificial systems . 
Decisions not to offer nutritional support to suc h elderly people shou ld 
rarely be made and only after much consu ltat ion and deliberation. They 
shou ld a ls o be constrained by procedural safeguards both within the 
institution and in the law. The Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the 
National Conference of Catho li c Bishops has recently issued two moral 
commentaries on legislation regarding decisions about life-sustaini ng 
treatment. The tone a nd content of both the Guidelines/a" Le[;islalion on 
Lile-Sustaining Treallnel1l (November, 1984) and their SWlemenl on 
Un iform Righlsollhe Terminally !II ACI (June, 1986)20 urge caution in the 
enactment of laws designed to facilitate termination of treatment 
decisions. And as Callahan and others have pointed out, current pressures 
to reduce health care costs create incentives to withhold treatment from 
the elderly and other vulnerable members of our society which can quickly 
lead to abuse of them. 21 The consultation and deliberation surrou nding the 
case of an eld erly person again should focus on what will promote the 
dignity of the person himself. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision In re Conro.l' is instructive not 
on ly because it offered some clearly delineated tests of the incompetent 
patient's best interests, but a lso because it applied them to Claire Conroy's 
situation very conservatively. In the absence of any reliable indication of 
the patient's wishes , the Court said , a guardian'S request to terminate 
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feeding co uld be honored if " the recurring, una voida ble and severe pain of 
the pati e nt 's life with the trea tment should be such that the effect of 
administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane."" Having 
weighed testimony about Conroy's condition, the Court rul ed that there 
was insuffici e nt evidence of pain to warrant the removal of the feeding 
tube . 
Among their c riter ia for the withdrawal of nutritional support from 
d ying patients, Dresser and Boisaubin include that "if medical evidence 
suggests that discontinuing nutriti o n would prod uce increased pain or 
discomfort, the pati e nt should be fed."~l At the same time, these authors 
acknowledge a need for more clinical information on th e degree to which 
specific fe eding regimes do , in fact. alleviate a g iven patie nt's distress and in 
general e nhance his / he r sense of well-being. They cite some evide nce 
which suggests that some hydration reg imes ma y even cause certain 
patients complications and discomfort which th ey would rather be spared. 
In spite of what we intuiti ve ly feel about alleviating a patien t's thirst. some 
are easily satisfied with ice chips or a glycerine swab. There are reports 
from caregivers indicating that "death from water deficiency appears 
painl ess and peace ful." ~.j Others claim on the contrary that deh ydration 
brings on a set of conditions which arc anything but painless. Again, 
clinical observations such as these need to be carefully interpreted a lways 
through th e filt e r of compassionate support for the individual patie nt. 
The Catholic moral tradition has mad e an important contribution to the 
current discussion about pro viding nutrition and hyd rati o n to th e ve ry 
sick . The Catholic posture is framed by a strong bias in favor of supporting 
life that is in constant tension with our need to accept finally the limitat ion 
of sickness and death . This pro-life attitude is the ex press ion of our belief 
that by His death and resurrection, J esus Christ has transformed sickness 
and death into the fullness of life . Our faith gives us the freedom not to feel 
bound to use every available means to prolong te mporal life, but to di sce rn 
what is best for eac h pati en t. including in that discernment our hope for 
"ete rnal life", a life full y transfo rmed in Jesus Christ. ' 
Hast y decisions to withdraw nutriti o nal support should be avoided. 
Such decisions should be made with sufficient consultation and 
deliberation, es pec iall y to check our tendency to make them for cost-
saving reaso ns. The Catholic moral tradition, as it ha s developed in 
response to the cvo lution of medical practice, supports th e view that the 
best interests of th e patient are protected if we defer to the patient himself 
o r herse lf. and if we e mplo y o nl y tho se measures including nutrition a nd 
hydrati o n which will help to sust a in him without impos ing on him 
excess ive burdens or futile treatme nt s . When feeding or o th e r life-support 
trea tm e nt s co nstitute a grave burd e n to th e patient or provide no 
th e rapeut ic benefit, there is no ob ligat ion - or eve n justification - for 
cont inuing them. Co mpassi on and respect for the person, of course, 
re4uire that we continue to offe r him o r her mora l a nd spiritual support as 
lon g as he or she linge rs. 
Linacre Quarterly 
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